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This paper provides with a review of the state of the art of environmental valuation with 
discrete  choice  experiments  (DCE).  The  growing  body  of  literature  on  this  field  serves  to 
emphasise the increasing role that DCE are playing in environmental decision making in the 
last decade. The paper attempts to cover the full process of undertaking a choice experiment, 
including survey and experimental design, econometric analysis of choice data and welfare 
analysis. The research on this field is found to be intense, although many challenges are put 
forward (e.g. choice task complexity and cognitive effort, experimental design, endogeneity or 
model uncertainty). Reviewing the state of the art of DCE serves to draw attention to the main 
challenges that this methodological approach will need to overcome in the coming years and 
to identify the frontiers in discrete choice analysis. 
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Using discrete choice experiments for environmental 
valuation 
 
1.  Introduction 
Initially developed by Louviere and Hensher (1982) and Louviere and Woodworth (1983), DCE 
resulted from the advances in many different disciplines: axiomatic conjoint measurement and 
information  integration  theory  in  psychology,  random  utility  theory-based  discrete  choice 
models in economics, and discrete multivariate models for contingency tables and optimal 
experimental design in statistics (Lancsar and Louviere, 2008). The first application of a DCE in 
the context of environmental resources was reported by Adamowicz et al. (1994). In the last 
decade the number of applications has significantly increased and DCE have become a popular 
stated preference method for environmental valuation.  
Discrete Choice Experiments (DCE) or, more generally, Attribute Based Stated Choice Methods 
(ABSCM) involves the generation and analysis of choice data through the construction of a 
hypothetical  market  using  a  survey.  DCE  consist  of  several  choice  sets,  each  containing 
hypothetical alternatives between which respondents are asked to choose their preferred one. 
Alternatives are defined by a set of attributes, each attribute taking one or more levels. Levels 
describe  ranges  over  which  attributes  vary  across  alternatives.  Individuals’  choices  imply 
implicit trade-offs between the levels of the attributes in the different alternatives included in 
a choice set. A baseline alternative (sometimes referred as status quo or ‘do nothing’ option) is 
usually included because one of the alternatives must always be in the respondents’ feasible 
choice set so that the results can be interpreted in standard welfare economic terms (Hanley   3 
et al., 2001).
1 When the cost or price of the programme is included as an attribute, marginal 
utility estimates can easily be converted into WTP estimates for changes in the attribute levels 
and,  by  combining  different  attribute  changes,  welfare  measures  may  be  obtained. 
Furthermore, given that compensating variation measures are obtained, results can directly be 
used within the cost-benefit analysis framework. Experimental designs are used to construct 
the choice sets, so that the attributes are uncorrelated and therefore yield un-confounded 
estimates  of  the  parameters.  The  resulting  choices  are  finally  analysed  to  estimate  the 
contribution that each attribute and level add to the overall utility of individuals.  
The  economic  model  underlying  a  DCE  is  intrinsically  linked  to  the  statistical  model:  it 
conditions the design of the survey and the analysis of data. As a consequence, undertaking a 
DCE  can  be  gathered  as  an  integrated  and  cyclical  process  in  which  an  economic  model 
describing the issue under analysis is permanently revised as new information is gathered from 
the experimental design, experts’ advice, focus groups and pilot surveys (Alpizar et al., 2001).  
Different  elicitation  methods  involve  a  different  choice  task  for  individuals  to  perform 
(Adamowicz  et  al.,  1998).  Hence,  ABSCM  can  take  different  forms:  choice  experiments, 
contingent ranking, contingent rating, paired comparisons and contingent grouping (see Table 
1). In the DCE, respondents are presented with a base state situation and some alternative 
states of the resource under valuation and are asked to choose the option that maximises their 
welfare. The contingent ranking method is similar but, instead of choosing, respondents are 
asked to rank the alternatives from the least to the most preferred one. This method provides 
with more information about the preferences of the  individuals but it also adds cognitive 
difficulty to the choice task. To conform to standard consumer theory, rankings chosen after 
                                                 
1 If the status quo option is not included, respondents would be ‘forced’ to choose. As a consequence, 
the  estimates  of  consumer  welfare  would  be  inaccurate  and,  more  importantly,  inconsistent  with 
demand theory.   4 
the status quo should be discarded from the estimation procedure.
2 In the contingent rating 
method individuals are asked to rate in a given scale the different alternatives presented. In 
this  case,  the  researcher  obtains  a  measure  of  the  magnitude  and  intensity  of  the  utility 
associated with each alternative presented. Applications of this methodology in environmental 
economics are scarce due to the difficulty that embraces transforming ratings into utilities and, 
more importantly, because of its inconsistency with consumer theory. 
Finally, the paired comparison is a variant of the DCE in which alternatives are presented in 
pairs to the respondent, who is not only asked to choose her preferred option but to indicate 
the strength of her preferences. More recently, a contingent grouping approach has also been 
proposed (Brey et al., 2007). In this method, individuals are asked for sorting the alternatives 
as better than or worse than the base state situation. 
 
Table 1 | Some ABSCM alternatives 
 
Approach  Task 
Welfare consistent 
estimates? 
Choice experiments  Choose between two or more alternatives 
(where one is the status quo) 
Yes 
Contingent ranking  Rank a series of alternatives  Depends 
Contingent rating  Score alternative scenarios on a scale of 1-10  Doubtful 
Paired comparisons  Score pairs of scenarios on a similar scale  Doubtful 




Source: Adapted from Hanley et al. (2001) 
 
At the cost of a higher cognitive burden, DCE have demonstrated to have some advantages 
over the contingent valuation method (CVM): (1) they may reduce potential biases of CVM; (2) 
                                                 
2 Caparros et al. (2008) show that DCEs and ranking experiments may provide similar results when the 
first rank is taken as a preferred option.   5 
they are capable of capturing more information from each respondent; and (3) they can test 
for  internal  consistency (Alpizar  et  al.,  2001).  A  comprehensive overview of this  valuation 
method can be found in Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985), Louviere, Hensher and Swait (2000), 
Train (2003) and Hensher, Rose and Greene (2005). 
This paper aims to review the state of the art of environmental valuation using DCE. Two 
further  objectives  are:  to  draw  attention  to  the  main  challenges  that  this  methodological 
approach will need to overcome in the coming years and to identify the frontiers in discrete 
choice analysis. The paper will be structured as follows: Section 2 presents the underlying 
economic  theory  of  DCE;  Section  3  describes  the  process  of  designing  a  DCE;  Section  4 
presents the econometrics of discrete choice responses; Section 5 discusses issues related to 
discrete choice analysis and interpretation; Section 6 outlines the frontiers in discrete choice 
analysis and Section 7 provides some concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Economic theory 
The foundation for most microeconomic models of consumer behaviour is utility maximisation 
under a budget constraint. The theoretical basis of DCE can be found in Lancaster’s (1966) 
characteristics theory of demand, welfare theory and consumer theory, in which individuals 
derive utility from the characteristics of a good rather than from the whole good. The DCE 
approach to preference elicitation is similar to the choice-based approach to consumer theory 
because it is explicitly assumed that respondents’ observed choices in the experiment reveal 
the preferences of the individuals. Thus, DCE combine the Lancasterian theory of value and the 
consumer demand models developed by Hanemann (1984). According to Hanemann (1984), 
the consumer decision can be separated into a discrete/continuous choice: which good to 
choose and how much of the chosen good to consume. In the context of a choice experiment, 
the decision is constructed so that the discrete choice is isolated. Given the public nature of   6 
many non-market goods (mainly in the sense that the quantity is fixed for all agents) each 
individual is able to choose only one alternative of the choice set, considering both its cost and 
its continuous dimension. 
More formally, each individual is assumed to solve the following maximisation problem: 
[ ] z A c A c A c U Max N N N x c ); ( ),..., ( ), ( 2 2 2 1 1 1 , , d d d d  
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N
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where, U[…] denotes a quasiconcave utility function; di is a dichotomous variable equal to one 
if the alternative i is chosen and zero otherwise; ci(Ai) is the alternative combination i as a 
function of its attributes, the vector Ai; pi is the cost/price attribute of each alternative; y is the 
level of income; and z is a composite bundle of goods with its price normalised to 1.  
The maximisation problem specified has some properties (Alpizar et al., 2001): 
1)  All  the  relevant  alternatives  are  defined  and  described  by  all  the  relevant  attributes. 
Therefore, the selection of attributes and attribute levels has a direct impact on the utility 
function defined. 
2)  The price variable in the budget constraint must be related to the full set of attributes 
conforming each alternative, thus reflecting a continuous dimension. 
3)  Restriction (ii) implies that only one alternative can be chosen in a given choice set. 
4)  For a given income level, the selection of one alternative (provided in an exogenously fixed 
quantity) implies that the amount of ordinary goods that can be purchased is also fixed.   7 
5)  Restriction  (iii)  implies  that  the  individual  will  choose  a  non-negative  quantity  of  the 
composite good and that an opt-out or status quo option is given. 
Two further assumptions need to be made in order to solve the maximisation problem: firstly, 
a purely discrete choice is assumed, and secondly, weak complementarity is assumed (i.e. the 
attribute levels of the non-selected alternatives have no influence on the utility function of the 
chosen alternative). Following Hanemann (1984): 





j i ¹ " . 
(2.2) 
Following Equations (2.1) and (2.2), and given  1 = j d , the conditional utility function can be 
written as: 
[ ] ( ) j j j j j j j j j c p y A V z y p A c V U - = = , , , ), ( .  (2.3) 
Going back to the unconditional indirect utility function, given by the following expression: 
[ ] [ ] ) , ( ),..., , ( max , , 1 1 1 1 1 N N N c p y A V c p y A V y p A V - - = ,  (2.4) 
it follows that, for a purely discrete choice, as the one described above, the individual chooses 
alternative j if and only if: 
j i c p y A V c p y A V i i i i j j j j ¹ " - > - ), , ( ) , ( .  (2.5) 
It is important to denote that the model above is a generalisation of the economic model 
underlying a close-ended CV survey. In the CVM there would only be two alternatives: the 
situation before the project and after the project so that an individual will accept the bid if her 
utility increases. Equations (2.4) and (2.5) also provide the deterministic model of consumer 
behaviour that will serve as a basis for the econometric model and the estimation of welfare 
effects that will be discussed in the following Section. In order to be operational, two decisions   8 
will need to be taken: the functional form of the utility function and the distribution of the 
error term that will be introduced in the model in order to capture unobservable behaviour. 
 
3.  Designing a DCE 
3.1.  Questionnaire development 
Designing and implementing a DCE requires a proper survey design. All the recommendations 
available for CV surveys (e.g. Mitchell and Carson (1989) among others) are also applicable to 
DCE.  However,  special  attention  needs  to  be  put  in  the  conceptualisation  of  the  choice 
process.  Two  issues  may  arise  at  this  point:  first,  the  analyst  should  pursue  an  incentive 
compatible  choice  question  to  avoid  respondents  to  not  giving  their  true  preferences; 
secondly,  the  choice  format  should  mimic  as  much  as  possible  the  actual  choice  context. 
Another focus of attention is the existence of a status quo option, especially in order to derive 
proper  welfare  measures.  Designing  a  DCE  is  a  cyclical  process  involving  four  steps:  (1) 
definition  of  attributes  and  levels  of  provision,  (2)  experimental  design,  (3)  questionnaire 
development,  and  (4)  sampling  strategy.  Feedbacks  from  different  stages  are  sequentially 
incorporated in the final design of the DCE. 
Environmental attributes and level of provision become critical aspects of any DCE given that 
the only information about preferences provided by respondents takes the form of choices 
between these options (Hensher, 2007). Attributes can be quantitative or qualitative and can 
be generic (same levels for all alternatives) or alternative specific (some attributes or levels 
may differ across alternatives). According to Lancaster (1991), an environmental attribute can 
be considered relevant if ignoring it would change our conclusions about the preferences of 
consumers.  While  respondents  may  consider  relevant  a  different  set  of  attributes,  it  is 
important  that  the  DCE  captures  the  main  attributes  to  the  majority  of  respondents  so 
concerns about omitted attributes are avoided. The construction of the choice sets included in   9 
an experiment requires a correct definition of the change to be valued and the attributes and 
levels  that  would  be  used.  Previous  scientific  investigation  on  the  environmental 
characteristics of the good or service under valuation, expert advice and focus groups may 
facilitate the definition of attributes and levels of provision. Focus groups may also help in 
deciding the best strategy for explaining the task of making successive choices from a series of 
choice sets. 
Levels should be plausible and relevant but this does not mean that they need to be currently 
available. Focus group sessions and pilot surveys may also help to identifying the appropriate 
levels of cost attribute. The payment vehicle and duration should be chosen in consonance 
with the good under valuation and its context. As Louviere et al. (2000) argue, the suitable 
number of attributes and levels is context specific. The analyst should weight up the relevant 
number of attributes and the complexity of the design. The trade-off between the possibility of 
omitted  variable  bias  and  task  complexity  and  cognitive  burden  to  respondents  may  be 
analysed in focus groups and pilot surveys. Additionally, it may be interesting to use focus 
groups to identify any possible interaction effect between attributes. Complexity of the choice 
task can be investigating with verbal protocols (Schkade and Payne, 1994). It may be useful to 
provide “warm-up” choice tasks to ensure repospodents’ correct understanding of the task 
(Carson et al., 1994). 
Finally, iterative pilot tests are required in order to develop a DCE survey. Pilot tests should 
check for respondents’ understanding of the choice context and task, the adequacy of the 
attributes and levels considered and other factors such as length and timing.  
 
3.2.  Experimental design 
The DCE data generation process relies on experimental design. An experimental design is a 
combination of attributes and levels used to construct the alternatives included in the choice   10
sets. The generation of the experimental design represents a main and complex component of 
stated choice studies. In fact, the allocation of attributes and attribute levels in generating 
choice sets for an experimental design can have a significant influence on the study outputs 
(Bliemer et al., 2009). In a typical DCE, respondents face a number of hypothetical scenarios 
(choice sets) containing a set of alternatives that differ on a number of attribute or level 
dimensions.  Respondents’  stated  alternative  choices  in  every  choice  situation  are  used  to 
estimate parameter weights for each of the attributes and the analyst may obtain estimates of 
marginal rates of substitution between them. Identification and efficiency are the two main 
statistical issues involved in the experimental design construction. Identification is related to 
the effects that can be independently estimated, which is further related to the specification of 
the indirect utility function. Efficiency, on the other hand, is related to the precision of the 
parameter estimates.  
So, before creating an experimental design, the model and the parameters to be estimated 
need  to  be  specified.  Essentially,  this  means  that  the  first  step  involves  a  complete 
specification of the utility functions. For this purpose, it is important to consider the number of 
alternatives and the number of attributes that will form each alternative, the consideration of 
generic or alternative-specific attributes (including alternative specific constant issues), the 
inclusion of interaction effects between attributes and the consideration of nonlinear effects 
via dummy-coded or effects-coded variables. At this stage, it is important to bear in mind two 
issues (Bliemer and Rose, 2006): firstly, that each additional parameter represents an extra 
degree of freedom. In other words, the number of choice sets in the experimental design must 
be  equal  or  greater  than  the  degrees  of  freedom  (i.e.  the  total  number  of  parameters 
excluding the constants plus one); and, secondly, that the design would be suboptimal if at the 
estimation stage the model estimation is changed or extra variables are added to the utility 
functions (e.g. socioeconomic variables).   11
The form of the estimated indirect utility function will ultimately depend on the experimental 
design  and  the  type  of  choice  model  used.  Different  choice  models  can  be  estimated 
depending on the assumption about the distribution and properties of the error component 
and about the variance-covariance matrix of estimated preference parameters. Sometimes 
economic  theory  may  give  some  advice  on  the  functional  forms  of  individual  variables. 
Alternatively, some authors recommend estimating the most disaggregated possible model by 
including  parameters  estimates  for  every  attribute  level  but  one,  and  mapping  obtained 
parameters against the attribute level to visualise its functional form. 
The second main step in the experimental design construction involves the generation of the 
experimental design. Prior to the design some decisions need to be taken: (1) whether the 
experiment will be labelled or unlabelled; (2) the consideration of attribute level balance
3 so 
that it is ensured that the parameters can be estimated on the whole range of levels; (3) the 
number of attribute levels, considering that the more levels used and the more different the 
levels  are  between  the  attributes  the  higher  number  of  choice  sets  will  be;  and  (4)  the 
attribute level range should be wide enough so that parameter estimates will have smaller 
standard errors and it ensures a broader application interval.
4 
At this stage, several different designs can be considered. A full factorial design includes all 
possible  combinations  of  attributes  and  levels.  Given  that  all  possible  combinations  are 
included, a full factorial design allows for estimation of main effects and interactions effects 
independently of one another. However, given that the number of combinations may become 
too large, fractional factorial designs are usually implemented. A fractional factorial design is a 
sample of the full design that allows the estimation of all the effects of interest (typically main 
                                                 
3 Attribute level balance requires that the different levels appear an equal number of times for each 
attribute. 
4 It is important to bear in mind that the model estimated will only be applicable on the data range it 
was estimated on.   12
effects only or main effects plus some higher-order interaction effects). Full and fractional 
factorial  designs  can  also  be  blocked  into  different  versions  to  which  respondents  are 
randomly assigned. In case of a blocked design some authors have suggested to include a 
version variable in the estimation to account for version effects (Lancsar and Louviere, 2008). 
Fractional factorial designs can be orthogonal (i.e. those pursuing no correlation between the 
attribute  levels)  or  so-called  efficient  designs  (i.e.  those  pursuing  the  minimum  predicted 
standard errors of the parameter estimates). An additional difference between the two is the 
amount of information required because efficient designs rely on prior information about the 
parameter estimates. 
Efficiency  is  a  measure  of  the  level  of  precision  in  which  effects  are  estimated.  Various 
efficiency criterions have been proposed, such as A-error or D-error. The D-error has become 
the most widely used measured of efficiency because of its insensitivity to the magnitude of 
the scale of the parameters. According to Street et al. (2005), D-efficiency is determined by the 
following expression: 
[ ]
r / 1 ) det( / ) det( opt C C Efficiency D = - ,  (3.1) 
where C is the Fisher Information Matrix and Copt is the largest value of C, det stands for 
determinant and r is the number of parameters to be estimated in the model.  
Huber and Zwerina (1996) distinguish four characteristics for an efficient experimental design: 
(1) orthogonality; (2) level balance; (3) minimal overlap; and (4) utility balance. As mentioned 
above, the problem with so-called efficient designs is that they require prior information about 
the true distribution of the parameters. Optimal efficient design is a research field in constant 
progress during the last few years. 
Although the inclusion of a status quo option may reduce efficiency, it may be justified on the 
grounds of better congruency with consumer theory and real choices. Furthermore, in non-  13
labelled experiments the inclusion of status quo options does not affect optimality. Deshazo 
and  Fermo  (2002)  argue  that  as  the  complexity  of  DCE  increases  choice  inconsistency 
increases, although careful design and estimation may help mitigating unobserved variability. 
The empirical evidence on task complexity suggests that experiments should be very carefully 
designed and estimated, and that it should be no more complex than the market it aims to 
simulate. If the analyst needs to handle implausible attribute combinations in order to increase 
realism (either by constraining the design or by randomly substituting implausible for plausible 
combinations) she should acknowledge the subsequent loss of efficiency and make sure that 
the  properties  of  the  design  remain  desirable.  In  other  words,  there  may  be  a  trade-off 
between optimality and plausibility. It is clear that from a statistical perspective optimal design 
is  desirable,  but  from  an  empirical  perspective  some  other  issues  need  to  be  taken  into 
account, such as task complexity, heuristics or the inclusion of a base scenario or status quo 
option (Lancsar and Louviere, 2008).
5 
One important question that arises when designing the price vector of an experimental design 
is the sensitivity of the WTP estimates to changes in the design. In other words, the question is 
whether  DCE  would  share  the  anchoring,  starting-point  of  framing  effects  sometimes 
encountered in CVM. The empirical evidence suggests, however, that when accounting for 
scale effects the structure of preferences and WTP estimates is not significantly different when 
changing the price vector (Hanley et al., 2005). These issues will be further analysed in Section 
5.4. 
Computer  software,  including  SAS,  SPSS,  JMP  or  more  recently  NGENE,  has  been  used  to 
generate experimental designs. Other resources on the internet include a library of orthogonal 
                                                 
5 In the presence of complex choices respondents may use heuristics or rules of thumb to simplify the 
decision task, including maximin and maximax strategies and lexicographic ordering (Tversky, 1972).   14
arrays
6  as  well  as  a  web  page  devoted  to  constructing  or  checking  designs  developed  by 
Devorah Street and Leonie Burgess.
7 
 
3.3.  Survey administration 
The proper sampling strategy requires a consideration of the relevant population. Sample size 
should be as large as the requirements of the estimation of reliable models, but obviously 
subject  to  available  budget  and  other  constraints.  It  is  difficult  to  determine  the  optimal 
sample  size  for  non-linear  choice  models  because  it  depends  on  the  true  values  of  the 
unknown parameters estimated.  
Several sampling strategies can be adopted. In a simple random sampling, the probability of 
being  drawn  is  identical  for  each  individual.  In  an  exogenously  stratified  sampling,  the 
probability of being drawn depends on independent variables. Finally, in an endogenously 
stratified  sampling  the  probability  of  being  drawn  depends  both  on  dependent  and 
independent variables. Estimation methods vary over the different sampling procedures. If the 
sample  is  exogenously  drawn  (either  random  or  stratified  random),  maximum  likelihood 
estimation may be used. If, on the other hand, the sample is endogenously drawn, conditional 
maximum likelihood estimation is required (Train, 2003). 
 
4.  Econometrics of discrete choice experiments 
It is not infrequent to find that observed choices may reveal preference structure inconsistent 
with the deterministic model described in the previous Section. It is generally assumed that 
these inconsistencies are due to unobserved factors such as characteristics of the individual, 
                                                 
6 http://www.research.att.com/~njas/oadir/index.html  
7 http://crsu.science.uts.edu.au/choice/choice.html    15
non-included  attributes  in  the  experiment,  measurement  error  or  heterogeneity  of 
preferences (Hanemann and Kanninen, 1999).  
 
4.1.  Models for discrete choice analysis 
The analysis of the choices made in DCE is based on random utility theory. The random utility 
approach  developed  by  McFadden  (1974)  is  used  to  link  the  deterministic  model  with  a 
statistical model of human behaviour. The randomness of the utility function suggests that 
only analysis of the probability of choosing one alternative over another is possible. Estimable 
choice models require a distributional assumption for the random component. 
As  a  consequence,  a  random  disturbance  with  a  specified  probability  distribution,  e,  is 
introduced into the economic model. In this context, an individual will choose alternative j if 
and only if: 
j i c p y A V c p y A V i i i i i j j j j j ¹ " - > - ), , , ( ) , , ( e e .  (4.1) 
Or, in probability terms (following the notation from the previous Section): 
( ) j i c p y A V c p y A V P P i i i i j j j j j ¹ " - > - = = , ) , , ( ) , , ( ) 1 ( e e d .  (4.2) 
The  final  specification  of  the  econometric  model  will  ultimately  depend  on  two  further 
decisions: (i) the specification of the utility function (i.e. how the random term enters the 
conditional  indirect  utility  function),  and  (ii)  the  distributional  assumption  for  the  error 
component. 
The most common formulation for the utility function is additively separable, so that the error 
component  enters  the  utility  function  as  an  additive  term.  Under  this  assumption,  the 
probability statement of Equation (4.2) becomes:   16
( ) j i c p y A V c p y A V P P i i i i j j j j j ¹ " + - > + - = = , ) , ( ) , ( ) 1 ( e e d .  (4.3) 
The specification of the utility function requires two additional decisions: the functional form 
for Vj and the relevant attributes Aj that will determine the utility level for each alternative. 
The deterministic component of utility is usually assumed to be a linear and additive function 
of the attributes of the good and the characteristics of the respondent ( j X ): 
j j x V ' b = ,  (4.4)  
where  b  is a vector of coefficients to be estimated. Utility is a latent quantity while choices 
are the only observable indicator of utility. The linear in parameters formulation of the utility 
function is simple and convenient, and it does not exclude the possibility of including non-
linear  effects  on  utility  through  for  example  a  quadratic  utility  function.  Less  restrictive 
formulations (although sometimes more flexible) may carry some complications. One crucial 
assumption relates to the way that income enters the utility function. A constant marginal 
utility of income is usually assumed because it facilitates the estimation of welfare measures, 
although it may not be always reasonable. Regarding the influence of selected attributes and 
interactions it is important to denote that the data collected in a DCE is based on a specific 
experimental  design  that  will  condition  the  estimation  of  interaction  effects  between  the 
relevant attributes. 
The second decision regarding the final specification of the econometric model relates to the 
specification of the probability distribution of the error term. Assuming that the DCE has M 
choice  sets  (Sm),  each  formed  by  Km  alternatives  with  Ai  attributes  such  that 
{ } Km m m A A S ,..., 1 = , the probability of choosing alternative  j from a choice set Sm can be 
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Under  the  assumption  that  the  error  terms  of  the  utility  function  are  independently  and 
identically distributed following a type I extreme value (Gumbel) distribution, the choice model 
can be estimated using a multinomial logit (MNL) specification  (McFadden 1974, Louviere et 
al. 2000). In general, utility can be expressed as  ,
* *
ij ij ij V U e + =  where the error component has 
variance  ) 6 / (
2 2 p s ´ . Thus, utility may be divided by σ without changing behaviour given 
that the scale of utility is irrelevant to behaviour:  , / ij ij ij V U e s + = where  s e e /
*
ij ij = and the 
variance of the error component simply becomes  6 /
2 p . The MNL statistical model represents 
the probability of choosing an alternative j such that the utility of that alternative is greater 
than  the  utility  of  all  other  alternatives.  The  probability  of  an  individual  i  choosing  an 

















Given that we have assumed that Vij is linear in parameters with coefficients β*, the choice 





















so that each coefficient is in fact scaled by  s / 1  (and therefore σ is called the scale parameter) 
and and c is a choice set. In other words, the scale parameter scales the true parameters to 
reflect the variance of the unobserved portion of utility, so that the parameter estimates β are, 
in fact,  s b /
* .    18
The scale parameter cannot be identified from the data set so it is usually normalized to one, 
implying  constant  error  variance.  However,  the  existence  of  a  scale  parameter  has  two 
implications for the analysis of results: on the one hand, an increase in the scale reduces the 
variance (i.e. high fitting models have larger scales); and secondly, it imposes restrictions on 
the interpretation of the estimated coefficients (i.e. coefficients can be compared within an 
estimated model but not across different models). 
The  key  assumption of  the  MNL  model  is  not  so much  that  the error  term  is  distributed 
following a Gumbel distribution, but that the errors are independent of each other. It basically 
means that the unobserved part of utility for one alternative is unrelated to the unobserved 
part of utility for the other alternatives. If this is not the case, the researcher faces three 
options (1) to specify a model that allows for correlation, (2) to respecify the utility function so 
that the source of correlation is captured by another variable and the error terms remain 
independent, or (3) to maintain the current specification of utility acknowledging that the 
model may be an approximation.  
The power and limitations of the MNL model can be elucidated under the following criteria 
(Train, 2003): (1) MNL can represent systematic taste variations (i.e. those related to observed 
characteristics of the respondents) but not random taste variations (i.e. those that cannot be 
linked  to  observed  characteristics  of  the  respondents),  (2)  the  MNL  exhibits  restrictive 
substitution patterns because it implies proportional substitution across alternatives given the 
specification of the utility function, and (3) the MNL can handle situations where unobserved 
factors are independent over time but it cannot be used with panel data when unobserved 
factors are correlated over time for each respondent. 
In the first place, observed heterogeneity can be incorporated into the systematic part of the 
model  by  including  interactions  between  attributes  or  constant  terms  and  socioeconomic   19
characteristics  of  the  respondents.  Therefore,  the  MNL  model  can  only  handle  observed 
heterogeneity but not unobserved heterogeneity. 
The substitution patterns of MNL models relate to the property of Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives (IIA). The IIA axiom states that “the ratio of the probabilities of choosing one 
alternative over another (given that both alternatives have a non-zero probability of choice) is 
unaffected  by  the  presence  or  absence  of  any  additional  alternatives  in  the  choice  set” 








P = . 
(4.8) 
As  a  consequence,  IIA  depends  both  on  the  choice  and  on  the  variables  included  in  the 
specification of Vij, that are assumed to be identically and independently distributed (IID). In 
case of violation of IIA, the parameters estimation would be biased. The IIA property is usually 
checked using the test proposed by Hausman and McFadden (1984). Alternatively, IIA can be 
more simply tested by estimating a mixed logit model and testing whether the variance of the 
mixing distribution is equal to zero. 
In the context of panel data, where several choices from the same individual are observed, the 
MNL specification treats the data as cross-sectional given that the unobserved factors affecting 
the respondent’s choice are assumed to be independent.  
The independence of the error terms assumption may seem restrictive but, in fact, it can be 
seen as the natural outcome of a correctly specified utility function that captures all sources of 
correlation explicitely and leaves as a ‘white noise’ the unobserved part of utility (Train, 2003). 
However,  not  infrequently  the  IIA  hypothesis  does  not  hold  and  the  researcher  needs  to 
incorporate correlation among alternatives. Generalised extreme value (GEV) models are a 
bunch  of  models  attempting  to  include  different  substitution  patterns  under  a  unifying 
framework: unobserved utility for all alternatives are jointly distributed as generalised extreme   20
value. These models, therefore, relax the second restriction of the MNL model. GEV models 
collapse to the standard MNL model when all correlations are zero. The most widely used GEV 
model is the nested logit model, although other suggested models include the cross-nested 
logit model, the network GEV model, the paired combinatorial logit model or the generalised 
nested logit model. 
Multinomial Probit (MNP) models deal with all three previously detected restrictions: they can 
incorporated random taste variations, they allow any pattern of substitution and they can 
handle with correlated errors. However, this model specification has two limitations: firstly, it 
is computationally more demanding and, more importantly, it requires normal distributions for 
all  unobserved  components  of  the  utility  function.  The  problem  is  that,  under  some 
circumstances, normal distributions may not be appropriate. 
The Mixed Logit (MXL) model is able to overcome all the limitations previously enumerated. It 
is important to denote that the MXL model nests many particular specifications used in the 
relevant literature. Furthermore, under some basic conditions, the choice probabilities of any 
RUM discrete choice model can be derived from a MXL model specification (McFadden and 
Train, 2000). 
The remarkable growth in the use of MXL models in recent years can be partly explained by 
their  inclusion  in  standard  econometric  software  and  partly  by  their  flexible  assumptions. 
There  are  three  main  advantages  when  a  MXL  model  specification  is  used:  preference 
heterogeneity is directly incorporated through individuals’ random taste variations; it avoids 
any reliance on the IIA property; and it is capable of incorporating correlation across choice 
sets and alternatives. Its popularity has kept growing in spite of some problems related to 
inference and model selection (Brownstone, 2001).   
MXL is a mixture of the logit function (see Equation (4.6)) evaluated at different parameters 




























The  mixing  distribution  of  the  parameters  can  be  discrete  or  continuous.  If  the  mixing 
distribution is formed by a finite set of distinct values, the MXL becomes the latent class 
model. If the mixing distribution is continuous, a random parameters logit (RPL) model (also 
known as random coefficients model) or an error component (EC) model can be derived from 
the MXL probability.  
In the RPL model, a random term whose distribution over individuals and alternatives depends 
in general on underlying parameters is added to a classical utility function associated with each 
alternative, that is:  
ij ij i ij ij x x U e h b + + = ' ,   (4.10) 
where  i h  is a vector of deviation parameters and  ij e  is the error component. If the error 
terms are IID type I extreme value, we have a random parameter logit (RPL) model; if the error 
terms are IID normal distributed, we have a random parameter probit (RPP) model. So, the RPL 
is a model in which an individual’s utility from any alternative in the choice set includes a 
stochastic  part that may be  correlated over  alternatives  and  that may  be  heteroskedastic 
(Henser et al., 2005). In this model, preference heterogeneity is directly incorporated into the 
vector of  parameters,  so that  the vector of  coefficients  of  attributes  is  different  for each 
individual,  i b , and it is allowed to deviate from the population mean coefficient  b by the 
vector of deviation parameters  i h .  
The use of a MXL model involves three main specification issues: (1) the determination of 
which  parameters  should  be  modelled  as  randomly  distributed,  (2)  the  choice  of  mixing   22
distribution for the random coefficients and (3) the economic interpretation of the randomly 
distributed coefficients.  
The classical procedure to determine the random coefficients is to select among different 
model specifications (including/excluding random coefficients) using the Likelihhod Ratio (LR) 
test.  A  second  possibility  is  the  use  of  the  Lagrange  Multiplier  (LM)  test,  as  proposed  by 
McFadden and Train (2000). This test proceeds by constructing artificial variables: 









j tj tC P x x , t denotes the parameters that are suspected to be random, C is the set 
of alternatives being offered, and Pj is the choice probability for alternative j. Once the model 
is reestimated including the artificial variables, the null hypothesis of fix parameters for t can 
be rejected using a simple LR or Wald test when the coefficients for the artificial variables are 
significantly different from zero. The choice of the mixing distribution is part of an ongoing 
debate that will be further analysed in Section 6.3. 
Alternatively, a MXL model can be derived without a RPL interpretation, as simply representing 
error components creating correlation among the utilities for different alternatives. In this 
case, the unobserved (random) part of utility is becomes:  ij ij i ij x e m h + = , so that correlation 
over  alternatives  depends  on  the  specification  of  ij x .  If  there  is  no  correlation  among 
alternatives,  ij x is identically zero and the probability model collapses to the standard MNL 
model.  
Finally, it is also important to bear in mind that in the MXL it is further assumed that the 
preferences are allowed to vary among individuals but are stable among the choice situations, 
although this assumption can be relaxed to allow for fatigue or learning effects.   23
 
4.2.  Welfare measures 
Following  standard  consumer  theory,  the  marginal  rate  of  substitution  (MRS)  between 
attributes can be obtained by calculating the ratio of the partial derivatives of the indirect 
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In the presence of a linearly additive indirect utility function as in Equation (4.4), the MRS 
equals the ratio of the estimated parameters. If the second attribute is the cost attribute, it is 
usually termed ‘implicit price’.
8 Similarly, compensating surplus (CS) welfare estimates for DCE 
may be obtained from Hanemann (1984b) and Train (1988): 
[ ] ∑ ∑ - - = ) exp( ln( ) exp( ln(
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where  a is  the  marginal  utility  of  income  (usually  represented  by  the  coefficient  of  the 
payment attribute) and 
0
ij X  and 
1
ij X  represent the vector of environmental attributes at initial 
level (status quo) and after the change levels, respectively. So Hicksian compensating variation 
measures a change in expected utility due to a change in the level of provision in the attribute 
or attributes by weighting this change by the marginal utility of income. Simplifying the above 
Equation, the marginal value of a change in one attribute is measured through the ratio of the 
two coefficients: 
                                                 
8 It is important to bear in mind that marginal rates of substitution measures such as WTP are not 







Therefore, the WTP for a marginal change in the level of provision of each environmental 
attribute (i.e. the marginal rate of substitution between income change and this attribute 
change) is obtained by dividing the coefficient of the attribute by the coefficient of the cost 
attribute. It is not infrequent to report not only the marginal WTP but the distribution of 
welfare effects. This is usually done by bootstrapping techniques such as the Krinsky and Robb 
(1986) procedure. 
Finally, it is important to bear in mind the assumptions underlying the closed-form solution for 
the  welfare  measure  in  Equation  (4.13)  being:  additive  disturbances,  an  extreme-value 
distribution and constant marginal utility of income. The problem of relaxing the hypothesis of 
constant  marginal  utility  of  income  is  that  it  complicates  the  estimation  of  compensating 
surplus measures because income enters the utility function non-linearly. Some approaches to 
incorporate income effects in random utility models have been proposed by McFadden (1995) 
and Morey et al. (1993). 
 
5.  Discrete choice analysis 
The development of a model specification is not straightforward. Instead, it can be gathered as 
a combination of behavioural theories and statistical methods with subjective judgements of 
the researcher. The ‘art of model building’, as some authors argue, suggests that the most 
appropriate  specification  of  a  DC  model  requires  formal  theories,  researcher’s  a  priori 
knowledge of the phenomenon being modelled and statistical inference. In practice, the model 
development  process  generally  begins  with  some  theoretical  inputs.  It  follows  with  a 
sequential process of model estimations and various formal and informal tests for narrowing 
the  alternative  specifications.  In  this  process,  the  analyst  tries  to  revise  the  a  priori   25
assumptions  with  the  statistical  findings.  Once  the  model  specification  is  found  to  be 
consistent  with  the  theory,  model  selection  is  based  on  goodness-of-fit  performance  and 
statistical significance tests. 
 
5.1.  Model specification 
In the process of model specification, the analyst needs to tackle many important issues. In the 
previous Section, models for DCE have been reviewed. The present Section will focus on two 
related issues: the coding of explanatory variables and the inclusion or exclusion of alternative 
specific constants (ASC).  
There are three options for the coding of explanatory variables: mean-centering numerical 
attributes,  effects coding and  dummy  coding.  The  first  two  options  are  usually  preferable 
because they avoid correlation with the intercepts  and minimise collinearity in estimation 
matrices  used  to  estimate  interactions.  Even  though  effects  coding  estimation  requires 
omitting one level, it can be easily calculated as minus one times the sum of the estimated 
levels. 
The inclusion or exclusion of ASC in DCE has also received special attention. ASC refers to a 
parameter for a particular alternative representing the role of unobserved sources of utility. 
The  problem  is  that  the  inclusion  or  omission  of  elements  of  the  utility  function  in  the 
estimation process can have a significant influence on the obtained welfare measures (Mogas 
et  al.,  2006).  In  the  context  of  unlabelled  experiments  (i.e.  those  experiments  containing 
generic alternatives), such as those generally used in environmental valuation, it has been 
argued that including an ASC would violate the meaning of unlabelled and that the correct way 
to proceed would be to exclude constant terms for all unlabelled alternatives (Hensher et al., 
2005). By doing this, the average unobserved effect for all alternatives is constrained to be 
zero. The omission of the ASCs has been justified on the grounds that, even thought they may   26
improve the model fit, they are not related to specific attributes and hence do not explain 
choices in terms of observable attributes (Adamowicz et al., 1997). In other words, they lack 
behavioural  interpretation.  Applications  excluding  ASCs  are  abundant  in  the  literature 
(Bienabe and Hearne, 2006; Nielsen et al., 2007; Xu et al., 2003). However, when excluding an 
ASC the remainder of the model parameters would attempt to capture this effect, resulting in 
biased attribute parameter estimates. Hence, it has been argued that ASCs are important in 
order to interpret the preferences of the individuals (Morrison et al., 2002). For instance, it has 
been  interpreted  as  a  status  quo  bias
9  or  endowment  effect  (Adamowicz  et  al.,  1998). 
Alternatively, depending on the sign, it has also been interpreted as that respondents may 
have a utility premium for moving away from the status quo (Mogas et al., 2006). Thus, some 
studies would use an alternative specific constant for the status quo alternative, even if the 
attributes are generic (Birol et al., 2006; Horne et al., 2005; Rolfe et al., 2000). Current state of 
the art in discrete choice analysis favours the latter approach. 
 
5.2.  Goodness of fit  
Goodness of fit of estimated models is usually measured by a statistic called the likelihood 
ratio index (LRI) or pseudo-Rho squared. This statistic is often used to measure how well the 
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 (5.1) 
where LL(b ˆ ) is the value of the log-likelihood function at the estimated parameters and LL(0) 
denotes its value when all the parameters are set equal to zero. If the explanatory power of 
                                                 
9 The notion of ‘status quo bias’ (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988) refers to a common economic 
phenomenon where survey respodents tend to attach to the current situation.   27
the model is very low, the estimated model is no better than no model and so the LRI takes the 
value of zero. On the opposite, if the estimated model perfectly predicted every choice, the LRI 
would take the value one.  
Another informal goodness-of-fit test is the adjusted LRI (rho bar squared). It is similar to the 











where K denotes the number of unknown parameters in the model.  
 
5.3.  Model selection 
Selection of the appropriate model may be based on economic and behaviour theory as well as 
on statistical considerations such as LR test in the presence of nested models. The LR statistic 
is: 
[ ] ) ˆ ( ) ˆ ( 2 U R LL LL b b - - ~
2
R U K K - c     (5.3) 
where  R b ˆ
  and  U b ˆ
  denote  the  estimated  coefficients  of  the  restricted  and  unrestricted 
models  respectively.  The  statistic  is 
2 c   distributed  with  R U K K -   degrees  of  freedom, 
representing the number of estimated coefficients in the unrestricted and restricted models. 
While non-nested hypothesis cannot be tested using the LR test, some different options have 
been proposed. One possibility is to construct a composite model and perform two LR tests for 
each of the two restricted model against the composite model, known as Cox Test (Cox, 1961; 
1962). A second possibility is to compare them using the adjusted LRI statistic and selecting the   28
one with the higher statistic. A third option would be to use the Davidson and MacKinnon J 
test (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1981). 
 
5.4.  Internal and external validity 
Internal  tests  of  validity  are  designed  to  check  the  standard  assumptions  about  the 
preferences of the individuals, namely that preferences are stable, complete, monotonic and 
transitive. Given that the SP survey designs basically force completeness of preferences, it is 
generally referred as preference consistency when the monotonicity, transitivity and stability 
axioms are complied with. The empirical evidence on internal validity is mixed. Carlsson and 
Martinsson (2001b) find no evidence of violation of the assumptions about transitivity and 
stability  of  preferences.  On  the  contrary,  many  authors  have  reported  preference 
inconsistency (Deshazo and Fermo, 2002; Johnson and Mathews, 2001; McIntosh and Ryan, 
2002). These results seem to confirm the initial worry of many academics that when moving 
from CVM to DCE, complexity-induced choice inconsistency increases. However, complexity-
induced inconsistencies may be mitigated if experiments are designed and estimated more 
carefully (Deshazo and Fermo, 2002). 
Rationality tests play a main role in identifying respondents showing preference inconsistency. 
The empirical research has shown that including “irrational responses” may bias the point 
estimates and increase its variance (Johnson and Mathews, 2001; Foster and Mourato, 2003). 
Rationality tests usually take the form of an additional choice task with a dominant alternative 
(e.g. Scarpa et al. (2007)). However, the researcher should bear in mind that some factors may 
underlie  what  it  is  labelled  as  ‘irrational’  and  removing  all  of  them  may  induce  sample 
selection bias and reduce the statistical efficiency and power of the estimated models (Lancsar 
and Louviere, 2006).   29
One of the main anomalies detected is failing to comply with the continuity axiom, a basic 
assumption  of  DCE  whereby  there  is  unlimited  substitutability  between  the  attributes 
employed  in  an  experiment.  The  implicit  assumption  in  RUM  is  that  individuals’  decisions 
respond to the compensatory heuristics, this is, individuals weight up the relative contribution 
of  the  different  attributes  to overall  utility choosing  the  one  reporting  the highest  utility. 
However, different disciplines have shown departures from compensatory heuristics such as 
psychology  (e.g.  Kahneman  and  Frederick  (2002),  Payne  et  al.  (1993)  or  Scott  (2002))  or 
economics (e.g. Campbell et al. (2008) or Araña and Leon (2009)). The main factors influencing 
non-compensatory  response  heuristics  are  complexity  of  the  choice  task  and  contextual 
factors.  
The discussion above suggests that people may employ simple decision-making heuristics and 
that  it  should  be  considered  when  deriving  welfare  estimates  in  the  DCE  methodological 
framework. Process heterogeneity, as defined by Hensher (2008), implies that the discrete 
choice  analysis  needs  to  recognise  and  account  for  the  many  different  ways  in  which 
individuals process information, in partly influenced by the analyst’s description of the context 
in which preference data is sought. The number of attributes included in a DCE is often related 
to  the  complexity  of  the  experiment  but,  as  this  author  argues,  this  argument  may  be 
misleading  since  it  establishes  a  direct  relationship  between  complexity  and  amount  of 
information rather than in relation to the relevance of information.  
As a consequence, there is a recent trend aiming to accommodate both the processing of 
attributes together with the choice outcome under the same framework. One way of dealing 
with this issue that has received special attention in the recent literature is by modelling 
attribute  non-attendance.  Ignoring  one  or  more  attributes  implies  non-compensatory 
behaviour among respondents (i.e. discontinuous preferences). One example of discontinuous 
preferences is lexicographic ordering. The problem of discontinuity in the context of DCE is 
that  without  continuity  marginal  rates  of  substitution  between  the  attributes  cannot  be   30
computed  at  the  individual  level.  However,  there  have  been  some  recent  attempts  to 
incorporate  discontinuous  preferences  in  the  DCE  framework  by  deriving  marginal  rate  of 
substitution  from  the  estimated  parameters  at  the  sampled  population  level.  Pucket  and 
Hensher  (2009)  and  Campbell  et  al.  (2008)  find  that  welfare  estimates  are  biased  when 
discontinuous preferences are ignored. More recently, Meyerhoff and Liebe (2009) find that 
accounting for discontinuous preferences at the choice task level improves the performance of 
the estimated models but it does not affect the WTP estimates. 
External validity is usually defined as the empirical evidence proving that the choice process 
and utility estimates obtained in a DCE are similar to those obtained in real markets (i.e. it 
compares  actual  and  hypothetical  behaviour).
10  The  close  relationship  between  choice 
experiments  and  consumer  purchasing  behaviour  suggests  that  DCE  should  pass  external 
validity  tests  and  that  they  should  be  less  prone  to  the  hypothetical  bias  sometimes 
encountered in CV studies. Even though the literature on external validity of DCE is smaller 
than the one on CVM, it suggests that DCE generally pass external tests of validity (Alpizar et 
al.,  2001;  Carlsson  and  Martinsson,  2001a;  Carson  et  al.,  1994).  More  recently,  Lusk  and 
Schroeder  (2004)  reported  the  existence  of  hypothetical  bias  in  average  WTP  but  not  in 
marginal WTP. These results seem to be in line with those obtained in the transportation 
literature when comparing RP and SP data, where SP data provides reasonable estimates of 
marginal changes in the quality attributes but it provides poor predictions of actual market 
shares (Louviere et al., 2000). 
Moving from the single binary discrete CV question to the series of questions involved in DCE 
implies a loss of incentive compatibility that may give rise to strategic behaviour. Although it 
has been argued that one of the advantages of DCE over CVM is that it may be more difficult to 
                                                 
10 It should be noted that comparing DCE outcomes requires accounting for differences in scale.   31
behave strategically in choice experiments,
11 Bateman et al. (2008) find empirical evidence of 
strategic behaviour in the context of valuing public goods. In respect to the welfare measures 
obtained, DCE and CVM have been proved to provide similar parameters on the marginal 
utility of income once variance heterogeneity is taken into account as well as similar error 
variance (Adamowicz et al., 1998). In general, CVM and DCE seem to provide not significantly 
different economic values (Adamowicz et al., 1998; Jin et al., 2006a; Mogas et al., 2006).  
There has been also some research on the biases sometimes encountered in CV studies. In 
respect to sensitivity to scope it has been found that DCE show stronger sensitivity to scope 
than CVM (Goldberg and Roosen, 2007; Foster and Mourato, 2003). Ladenburg and Olsen 
(2008)  find  that  preferences  obtained  in  DCE  are  susceptible  to  the  anchoring  effects  or 
starting  point  bias  often  encountered  in  dichotomous  choice  CV  studies.  These  findings 
suggest that, as a generalisation of the CVM, design issues are as important in DCE as they 
were  in  CVM  so  that  a  careful  survey  design  can  help  mitigating  the  biases  sometimes 
encountered in the literature. However, in order to be well established, DCE need more testing 
of its properties, as it has been the case with CVM (Bateman et al., 2008). 
 
6.  Frontiers in discrete choice analysis 
6.1.  Specification of the utility function 
The most common specification of the utility function in DCE is linear, as it was specified in 
Equation (4.4). However, it can be argued that utility functions are not likely to be linear due to 
the existence of diminishing marginal utilities or gain-loss asymmetries. In this context, models 
capable of accommodating non-linearities in the specification of the utility function are likely 
to have stronger explanatory variables. For example, an empirical investigation conducted by 
                                                 
11 For example, Alpizar et al. (2001) argue that by using unlabelled experiments the risk of individuals 
behaving strategically in DCE may be reduced   32
Lanz et al. (2009) finds non-linearities both in the environmental and cost attributes that, 
when non accounted for, end up in overestimation of the WTP and underestimation of the 
WTA. 
Non-linear specifications can take three forms: (1) capturing nonlinearities in the deterministic 
part of the utility function; (2) inclusion of discrete variables and (3) including multiplicative 
error  terms.  Firstly,  data  can  be  pre-processed  to  account  for  nonlinearities  in  the  utility 
function (for example, by using the log of a variable instead of the variable itself). Secondly, 
discrete variables, mainly used to capture qualitative attributes, can be used. And thirdly, two 
useful  approaches  for  accounting  for  nonlinearities  in  the  context  of  continuous  variables 
include  the  piecewise  linear  specification  and  the  power  series  expansion.  Nonlinear 
transformations of variables that are not linear in the unknown parameters include Box-Cox 
and Box-Tukey transformations (Greene, 2003). 
The  model  specification  can  be  generalised  to  account  for  nonlinearities  in  two  ways:  by 
introducing heteroskedasticity in the usual framework or by including random coefficients in 
the model. Finally, multiplicative error terms can be incorporated in RUM models. Fosgerau 
and  Bierlaire  (2009)  find  that  in  most  cases  a  multiplicative  specification  outperforms  an 
additive  specification  and  that  the  improvement  can  sometimes  even  be  larger  than  that 
gained from allowing for unobserved heterogeneity. 
Hess et al. (2008) have provided some evidence on asymmetrical responses to increases and 
decreases in the levels of the attributes describing alternatives in DCE. Their results seem to 
support the argument that utility functions depend on changes in the values of attributes 
rather  than  the  actual  values  themselves.  Allowing  for  asymmetrical  preferences  among 
respondents  means  that  a  larger  share  of  the  behavioural  pattern  can  be  explained  in  a 
deterministic manner rather than using MXL model specifications. 
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6.2.  Experimental design theory 
Interest  in  the  experimental  design  of  DCE  has  increased  in  environmental  economics, 
although the main research has been undertaken in the field of marketing and transportation. 
There is a growing attention on experimental design affecting an important factor in discrete 
choice analysis as the model specification used to analyse the data obtained.
12 The empirical 
applications  in  the  field  of  environmental  economics  have  mainly  relied  on  the  use  of 
orthogonal designs (Louviere et al., 2000). However, the use of orthogonal designs in DCE has 
been recently challenged (Huber and Zwerina, 1996; Kessels et al., 2006). A recent trend in the 
literature has started to move away from orthogonal designs towards designs which relate to 
the econometric models used in fitting DCE data.  
Huber and Zwerina (1996) were first to relate the statistical properties of the experimental 
design to the estimated econometric model, showing that targeting the minimum asymptotic 
standard errors of the parameter estimates rather than orthogonality in the design resulted in 
more efficient designs that improved the reliability of the parameter estimates. As argued by 
Train  (2003),  non-linear  models,  such  as  DCE,  should  rather  be  concerned  about  the 
differences  in  the  utility  functions.  Efficient  or  optimal  designs  attempt  to  link  the 
experimental design generation process with the smaller asymptotic standard errors of the 
parameter  estimates  based  on  the  idea  that  the  concern  in  DCE  it  is  not  the  correlation 
structure  between  the  attributes  but  the  correlations  of  the  differences  in  the  attributes. 
Orthogonality, within the context of DCE, should relate towards the correlation between the 
differences in the utility functions of the alternatives within the data rather than the actual 
values observed for each attribute (Bliemer and Rose, 2006). 
                                                 
12 Louviere (2006), for example, argues that researchers should provide the level of efficiency of their 
designs and make it available for peer-reviewing.   34
The central argument against the use of orthogonal designs in the context of DCE is that the 
statistical properties of orthogonal designs do not hold. Orthogonality in linear models not 
only avoids problems of multicollinearity in the estimated model, but more importantly, it 
minimises the standard errors of the parameter estimates. This is true because orthogonality 
minimises the elements of the model’s variance-covariance matrix. However, in non-linear 
models such as the models used in DCE, orthogonality has lower relation with the expected 
AVC matrix given that, on the one hand, the log-likelihood function and second derivatives of 
discrete choice models are dependent on the choice probabilities obtained for the choice data 
and, on the other hand, the only thing that matter in DCE is the differences in the utility 
functions between the chosen and non-chosen alternatives (Bliemer et al., 2009). 
Given that the parameters estimation is based on data sets obtained in DCE and not from the 
design itself, orthogonality will likely to be lost in the estimation process. Some reasons for 
losing orthogonality are missing responses, blocks not equally represented in the data set, 
inclusion of sociodemographic variables in the estimated models, or attribute levels not being 
equidistant  in  spacing.  So,  in  practice,  an  orthogonal  design  is  likely  to  end  up  in  non-
orthogonal data (Bliemer and Rose, 2006). 
The recent development of optimal or efficient designs has served to question the need for 
orthogonality.  These  designs  focus  on  generating  parameter  estimates  with  the  lowest 
standard  errors  by  determining  the  AVC  matrix  of  the  parameters.
13  In  this  case,  prior 
information on the parameter estimates (based for example on the results of similar studies or 
on a pilot survey) is used for deriving the AVC matrix. The efficient design will attempt to 
combine the choice situations so that the standard errors of the parameter estimates are 
minimised. In other words, the objective would be to minimise the efficiency error, as it has 
been shown in Section 3.2.  
                                                 
13 The square roots of the diagonal elements of the AVC matrix are the asymptotic standard errors.   35
Advanced designs are special efficient designs that either relax some assumptions or impose 
further constraints for practical reasons (Bliemer and Rose, 2006): constrained designs are 
those  in  which  some  combinations  of  the  attribute  levels  are  imposed  so  that  infeasible 
combinations  are  avoided;  pivot  designs  are  those  in  which  the  assumption  that  all 
respondents  face  the  same  choice  situations  are  relaxed  in order to  create more  realistic 
choice situations for a particular respondent; and designs with covariates are those in which 
individuals’ characteristics are included in the model in order to optimise the design for each 
group of respondents. 
From  the  above  discussion,  it  can  be  concluded  that  efficient  designs  will  outperform 
orthogonal designs if any information about the parameters is available. However, efficient 
designs create their own challenges: firstly, the determination of the priors used for generating 
the design, and secondly, that the final model form should be known in advance. Information 
on priors may be obtained from similar studies in the literature or by conducting a pilot study. 
Furthermore, one could argue that at least we could know that some parameters should have 
a negative sign (for example the cost attribute) or that desirable attributes such as a protected 
landscape should have a positive sign. The advantage of efficient designs is that this prior 
information can help developing experimental designs where either parameter estimates have 
lower  standard  errors  or  the  sample  size  required  is  smaller.  Some  authors  have  been 
concerned about the impact of prior parameter estimates on the final model results. However, 
Blimer et al. (2009) argue that “misspecification of priors may decrease the efficiency of the 
design but the efficiency will in general still be better than assuming zero priors.” 
The  second  challenge  in  generating  efficient  designs  is  that  efficiency  is  related  to  the 
econometric model that will most likely be used for estimating the parameters after collecting 
the data. This is due to the fact that the efficiency of a DCE is related to the AVC matrix of the 
model to be estimated and that different econometric models will have a different AVC matrix. 
So, depending on the estimated model, the same experimental design will end up in different   36
levels of efficiency. Bliemer et al. (2009) find that the efficiency of the design is maximized only 
when the model assumed in generating the design is the model that is fitted during estimation. 
This issue may raise concerns about how to generate efficient designs under uncertainty over 
the final model that will be estimated. Rose et al. (2009) propose a design generation based on 
a  model  averaging  approach  over  different  econometric  models.  Future  research  should 
concentrate on linking the statistical properties of DCE designs and respondent’s behaviour 
with, for example, information processing strategies (Bliemer and Rose, 2006).
14 
 
6.3.  Model estimation 
As it has been shown is Section 4.1, three inter-related issues are involved in the specification 
of heterogeneity in MXL models: the selection of the parameters that should be random, the 
choice of mixing distribution for these parameters  and their economic interpretation. The 
selection  of  random  parameters  was  already  discussed  in  Section  4.1.  This  Section  will 
concentrate on the problems that may arise when choosing mixing distributions for random 
parameters and its consequences in terms of allowing positive and negative coefficient values. 
This is an important yet unsolved issue because an inappropriate choice of mixing distribution 
is a potential source of model misspecification. It is also important to bear in mind that model 
fit may not always be an appropriate indicator of model performance. 
Estimating WTP measures using MXL models may be complicated because of the difficulty of 
maintaining theoretical consistency and actual behaviour of decision makers, constrained by 
the data collection and model specification. It is not infrequent to find applications of DCE 
using MXL models that have fixed the price coefficient, especially when the researcher aims to 
estimate the distribution of individuals’ WTP for environmental attributes (see for example 
                                                 
14 The Journal of Choice Modelling is currently (summer 2009) preparing a special issue dedicated to 
experimental design.   37
Layton  and  Brown  (2000)  or  Revelt  and  Train  (1998)).  The  main  problem  of  fixing  the 
distribution of the price coefficient when in fact scale varies over observations is that variation 
in scale would be erroneously translated into variation in WTP (Train and Weeks, 2005).  
Another  common  strategy  is  to  find  a  ‘reasonable’  distribution  of  the  price  coefficient 
acknowledging, on the one hand, that it should be chosen according to the data generating 
process and, on the other, that it should be consistent with theories of rational economic 
behaviour. In other words, obtaining a positive price coefficient (i.e. a positive marginal utility 
of income) seems inconsistent with the rational economic behaviour underlying the theory of 
random utility maximisation.
15 It is also important to bear in mind that if the environmental 
attribute and price coefficients are random, the WTP will follow an unknown distribution that 
will need to be simulated. As a consequence, the researcher may be in many cases interested 
in obtaining so-called reasonable WTP distributions (i.e. preventing WTP for changing sign or 
being unreasonably large).  
The Normal distribution has been commonly used in MXL models. Given that this distribution 
is symmetric and unbounded, the researcher assumes that positive and negative values for this 
coefficient can be found in the population. However, if the true distribution yielded strictly 
negative values with a mean close to zero and a long tail into the negative side, one cannot 
decide whether a non-zero probability of a positive coefficient is revealed by the data or if it is 
an artifact of the symmetrical nature of the Normal distribution. So, the Normal distribution 
may be used for parameters attributes where the researcher has no a priori assumption about 
                                                 
15  If  all  correlated  factors,  such  as  individual’s  prestige  effects,  were  properly  accounted  for,  the 
marginal  utility  of  income  should  be  negative  and  it  would  be  inappropriate  to  use  unbounded 
distributions of the price coefficient. However, the use of distributions with flexible bounds may allow 
for these correlated factors not accounted for to reveal themselves in particular empirical applications 
(Hess et al., 2005).   38
its sign but it could lead to false conclusions indicating a probability of sign change in the 
random coefficient that does not exist in the population. 
The  most  common  distribution  for  coefficients  with  an  explicit  sign  assumption  is  the 
Lognormal distribution. In this case, the distribution is bounded at zero so that there is no sign 
change. However, this distribution has a long tail on the unbounded side so that extremely 
large values may be found and it can overestimate standard deviations. Other distributions 
with a fixed bound include the Gamma, Rayleigh or Exponential distributions. As opposite to 
the previous case, the problem with distributions with a fixed bound at zero is that they will 
not allow for a sign change due to values revealed by the data, so the fit can be poorer.  
In  sum,  while  using  an  unbounded  distribution  the  analyst  may  be  forced  to  explain  a 
significant  probability  of  a  sign  change  by  alleging  that  some  agents  have  ‘irrational’ 
preferences,  by  arbitrarily  constraining  the  model  to  only  produce  the  sign  coefficient 
requirement  the  analyst  may  ignore  the  impact  of  data  or  model  imperfections.  As  a 
consequence,  Hess  et  al.  (2005)  argue  that  the  best  option  would  be  to  use  bounded 
distributions where the bounds are directly estimated from the data. This is the case of the 
Triangular distribution that not only avoids the long tails of the Normal distribution or the 
strict bounds of the Lognormal distribution but it can be asymmetrically defined. Another 
flexible  distribution  is  the  Johnson  Sb  distribution.  Despite  the  need  to  estimate  four 
parameters, this distribution has been proved to provide good results by Train and Sonnier 
(2005)  and  Hoyos  et  al.  (2009).  Other  possible  approaches  are  the  use  of  empirical 
distributions reflecting the actual distribution found in the sample (Hess et al., 2005) or to use 
censored distributions (Train and Sonnier, 2005). 
The  above  discussion  highlights  the  importance  of  assuming  mixing  distributions  that  are 
theoretically consistent but that allow, at the same time, for model imperfections. By doing 
this,  the  analyst  may  distinguish  whether  her  findings  are  inconsistencies  with  economic   39
theory or econometric artifacts due to the complexity of specifying taste heterogeneity in 
discrete choice models (Hess et al., 2005).  
Another related way of dealing with the problem of estimating WTP measures is to look at the 
consequences  of  placing  the  distributional  assumptions  in  the  preference  space  or  in  the 
willingness-to-pay space (Train and Weeks, 2005). In the first case, a distribution of coefficients 
in the utility function is specified and the distribution of the WTP is later derived. In the second 
case, a distribution of WTP is directly specified and the distribution of coefficients is later 
derived. Train and Weeks (2005) find that models in preference space fit better the data at the 
cost of less reasonable distributions of WTP compared to those models that work directly in 
the WTP space, where the number of individuals having untenably large WTP was significantly 
lower. 
There has been a recent interest in modelling the choices of individuals under the so-called 
individual-level  discrete  choice  models.  By  differentiating  the  distribution  of  tastes  at  the 
individual level, policy-makers may be provided with valuable information. Furthermore, by 
estimating models for single individuals empirical distributions of preferences can be directly 
estimated  so  that  random  parameters  of  finite  mixture  models  would  not  be  necessary 
(Louviere, 2006). However, the problem arises as how to obtain sufficient choice observations 
to estimate models for individuals. Two approaches have emerged: top-down and bottom-up 
approach. Top-down approaches estimate individual-level parameters indirectly, so that the 
aggregate preference distribution estimated in MXL models is combined with information of 
individuals’ choices to calculate conditional estimates of respondents’ preferences. Revelt and 
Train’s (2001) “maximum likelihood with conditioning of individual tastes” approach derives 
the distribution of tastes of an individual conditional on the observed choices of that particular 
individual and the estimates of the distribution of tastes in the population. A hierarchical Bayes 
(HB) estimation approach has been shown to provide similar results (Huber and Train, 2001). 
The  second  approach  proposed  by  Louviere  et  al.  (2009)  combines  optimal  designs  with   40
repeated best-worst choice questions in order to directly estimate individual parameters. In 
theory, if the mixing distributions are correctly specified and the number of choices per person 
sufficiently large, both approaches should converge. However, if the assumptions about the 
sample distribution of preferences are incorrect, inference based on the top-down approach 
will be biased and incorrect (Louviere et al., 2009). 
Another recent focus of concern among academics refers to the problem of endogeneity in 
DCE.  An  explanatory  variable  is  said  to  be  endogenous  when  it  is  correlated  (i.e.  not 
independent)  of  the  unobserved  factors.  Endogeneity  in  DCE  may  appear,  for  example, 
because of the influence of unobserved attributes or because the choices of decision-makers 
may be inter-related (Train, 2003). Several methods have been proposed to estimate DCE in 
the  presence  of  endogenous  explanatory  variables,  such  as  the  Berry-Levinsohn-Pakes 
approach (Berry et al., 1995), the control function approach (Petrin and Train, 2009) or the full 
maximum likelihood approach (Park and Gupta, 2009). Louviere et al. (2005) describe recent 
progress in dealing with endogeneity in DCE. 
Finally,  the  increasing  difficulty  in  maximising  more  complex  log-likelihood  functions  has 
motivated the development of new algorithms, such as the Expectation-Maximisation (EM) 
algorithm. The procedure to estimate models using the EM algorithm is explained in Train 
(2003). 
 
6.4.  Hypothesis testing 
Recent  developments  in  respect  to  hypothesis  testing  within  the  DCE  framework  have 
attempted  to  fill  some  gaps.  In  respect  to  nonlinear  specifications  (piecewise  linear 
specifications,  power  series  expansions  and  Box-Cox  transformations),  they  can  be  easily 
tested  using  LR  tests.  However,  other  potentially  problematic  issues  such  as  model   41
misspecification or the appropriateness of the distributional assumptions in RPL models are 
increasingly being analysed. 
Model misspecification generally invalids statistical inference, although it is rarely tested in DC 
models. For this purpose, Fosgerau (2008) has recently proposed the use of a nonparametric 
test of functional form, the Zheng test, to discrete choice models. The appropriateness of 
distributional assumptions of the random parameters included in RPL models is also rarely 
tested.  For  this  purpose,  Fosgerau  and  Bierlaire  (2007)  have  proposed  a  test  based  on 
seminonparametric (SNP) techniques.  
 
7.  Conclusions  
Environmental valuation with DCE is playing an increasingly significant role in environmental 
decision-making.  By  turning  the  focus  onto  how  preferences  for  nonmarket  goods  are 
organised,  DCE  aim  at  identifying  the  utility  that  individuals  derive  from  the  attributes 
conforming an environmental good or service under valuation. Despite the complexity of the 
task and the potential loss of incentive compatibility, the move from the CVM to the DCE has 
brought many potential advantages in terms of its multi-attribute approach and its ability to 
estimate  marginal  value  of  changes  in  the  levels  of  those  attributes.  Another  advantage 
encountered using DCE is that the incidence of ethical protesting seems to be lower (Hanley et 
al., 2001). DCE can also provide the opportunity to elicit a deeper understanding of the trade-
offs between different attributes (Adamowicz et al., 1998; Jin et al., 2006b). Further, when 
valuing multi-attribute programmes, DCE can be significantly cheaper to implement because it 
requires only one single questionnaire. Hence, given its inherent flexibility DCE may be, in 
many circumstances, a more useful tool compared to the CVM. In the words of Hanley et al. 
(2001), “DCE seem to be ideally suited to inform the choice and design of multidimensional 
policies”.    42
From  the  early  work  mainly  focused  on  recreation  demand,  the  use  of  DCE  has  rapidly 
increased in the fields of environmental and ecological economics as it can be shown by the 
vast amount of applications presented in specialised congresses. However, given its infancy 
state, more research is still needed in order to determine which experiments and response 
procedures  are  more  likely  to  produce  more  reliable  estimates.  As  many  authors  have 
highlighted,  it  is  clear  that  in  order  to  be  well  established  DCE  need  more  testing  of  its 
properties, as it has been the case with CVM (Bateman et al., 2008).  
Environmental valuation using SP methods is complex because it requires knowledge of many 
different disciplines such as economic theory, experimental and survey design theory, data 
collection and econometric analysis. The research in environmental and ecological economics 
is  further  complemented  by  the  developments  in  psychology,  marketing,  transportation, 
decision theory or statistics. In fact, interdisciplinary collaboration may be seen as a major 
contributor to this field. As Louviere (2006) argues: “virtually all major scientific breakthroughs 
result from cross-disciplinary innovations”. 
The research on environmental valuation using DCE has been intense in the last fifteen years 
but it can be still gathered as an infant research field. Many challenges need to be overcome. 
One of the main issues surrounding DCE is that of choice task complexity and cognitive effort. 
This  may  be  especially  true  when  respondents  are  asked  to  trade  between  complex  and 
unfamiliar goods and services such as those generally involved in environmental valuation. 
Undertaking  a DCE  requires  firstly  a  sound  construction of  the contextual  frame  in which 
choice  occasions  occur.  Experimental  economics  can  significantly  contribute  to  the  SP 
literature  at  this  stage  by  better  understanding  how  individuals  confront  institutions, 
incentives and information delivered in surveys and so improve the survey design  (Shogren, 
2006).  Experimental  design  has  been  also  shown  to  have  a  major  role  in  environmental 
valuation. Existing research has shown that more attention should be put to the choice set 
construction since changes in the design may systematically affect the parameter estimates   43
and the variances of the error terms (Adamowicz and Deshazo, 2006). Louviere (2006) warns 
about the impossibility of learning about individuals’ decision rules unless full factorial designs 
are used. At the estimation stage, differences in the preferences of individuals (i.e. preference 
heterogeneity)  should  be  adequately  identified  in  order  to  obtain  unbiased  estimates  of 
demand. Endogeneity also represents a major future challenge of environmental valuation. 
Finally, the researcher needs to embrace model uncertainty by choosing the ‘true’ model. In 
the absence of a single dominant selection criterion, some authors have suggested to obtain 
more preference information by pooling data and use model averaging approaches in order to 
obtain  more  efficient  estimates  (Layton  and  Lee,  2006).  Rather  than  generating  in  more 
complex statistically fitting choice models, some authors have argued for developing a better 
behavioural theory guiding both model specification and empirical research (Louviere, 2006). 
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